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Abstract
Deviating from standard possible-worlds semantics, authors belonging to what might be called
the ‘imperative tradition’ of deontic logic have proposed a semantics that directly represents norms
(or imperatives). The paper examines possible definitions of (monadic) deontic operators in such a
semantics and some properties of the resulting logical systems.
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1. Imperative semantics and basic operators
Deontic logic, i.e., the logical analysis of obligation, permission and prohibition, is usu-
ally modelled by a possible-worlds semantics, in which among the set of worlds a deontic
alternative or preference relation selects some as ‘ideal’ or ‘better’ compared to others.
However, when there is an explicit set of given imperatives, a code of norms, or a number
of specified tasks to complete for the agent, the appeal to some prohairetic notion for the
meaning of ought seems out of place. Instead, what is obligatory then depends on whether
it serves to satisfy the imperatives, avoid norm violations, or complete all the tasks.
In what might be termed the imperative tradition of deontic logic, a number of authors
have deviated from the standard approach by giving semantics that relates the meaning
of deontic operators to an explicitly given set of norms or imperatives.1 The general idea
E-mail address: jhansen@uni-leipzig.de.
1 In [8] I mention semantics of Kanger [14], Stenius [20], van Fraassen [21], Alchourrón and Bulygin [1].
A more comprehensive list should also include Smiley [19], and Niiniluoto [17]. Smiley, in a concept later en-
dorsed by Ruth Barcan Marcus [15] and motivated by an Andersonian [2] definition of a constant representing
the satisfaction of all normative demands, uses a ‘normative code’ consisting of propositions to define OA as
meaning that there is a finite number of propositions p1, . . . ,pn in this code such that (p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn → A) is a
logical truth. Niiniluoto represents commands by a tuple containing a proposition p, where the truth of OA then
depends on whether A is logically implied by one such p.
1570-8683/$ – see front matter  2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jal.2004.01.003
40 J. Hansen / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 39–61
behind imperative semantics is that to each command or imperative there is a descriptive
sentence that describes what must hold iff this imperative is satisfied. If a set of impera-
tives is under consideration, the set of corresponding descriptive sentences is then used of
in the definition of deontic operators. The proper representation of this set is controversial:
Directly representing imperatives by a set of descriptive sentences, as Kanger [14] and Al-
chourrón and Bulygin [1] have done, makes it appear as if norms can somehow be reduced
to factual statements. Others like van Fraassen [21], Niiniluoto [17] and myself [8], have
more cautiously represented imperatives by a set of objects that refer to states of affairs or
propositions, thereby following the doctrine that norms bear no truth values. For reasons of
readability I skip this intermediate step here, and use a set I ⊆L[BL] of descriptive sen-
tences that—in the language of a basic logic BL—mean the sentences associated with some
imperatives in the above sense. Deontic operators are then considered as giving information
about the properties of this set of imperative-associated descriptive sentences. The follow-
ing definitions of operators O1−5, differing in strength, will be employed throughout:
I |= O1A iff A ∈ I ,
I |= O2A iff ∃B ∈ I :|=BL B ↔ A,
I |= O3A iff ∃B ∈ I :|=BL B → A,
I |= O4A iff ∃B1, . . . ,Bn ∈ I :|=BL (B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bn) → A,
I |= O5A iff I |=BL A.
O1A is true iff A is one of the sentences in I , i.e., A (literally) corresponds to what an im-
perative demands. O2A is true iff the truth of A is BL-logically a necessary and sufficient
condition for the fulfillment of what one imperative demands.2 Similar to Niiniluoto’s [17]
operator, O3A is true iff A is BL-implied by what some imperative demands. Similar to
Smiley’s [19] operator, O4A is true iff a finite subset of imperative-associated sentences
BL-implies A. Finally and similar to Alchourrón–Bulygin’s [1] operator, O5A is true iff A
is BL-implied by the set of all such sentences. Note that while all of O1 −O4 presuppose
the existence of some sentence in I , O5A can hold for (BL-valid) sentences A even when
I contains no object.
Discussing the general framework, I showed in [8] how a number of well-known sys-
tems of monadic and dyadic deontic logic can be reconstructed with respect to imperative
semantics. The present paper examines some details and problems connected with monadic
deontic logics facilitated by the above semantics. Section 2 gives logical systems for each
of the above operators. Section 3 then examines systems that include several of these op-
erators. In Section 4 we take a look at possible semantic restrictions on the content of
imperatives, and see what changes must be applied to logical systems to correspond to
them. Section 5 examines more closely the definitions van Fraassen [21] proposed for
O-operators, and provides a monotonic system to resemble his reasoning, and Section 6
addresses a ‘sceptical’ definition of ought proposed by Horty [12] to deal with normative
conflicts. Finally, in Section 7 I give systems and semantics for extended languages that
permit iterated and nested deontic operators of the types presented above.
2 In the terminology of Brown [4] O2 is a “type 2” operator, whereas operators O3−5 would be “type 1”, their
scope being a necessary condition for norm satisfaction only.
J. Hansen / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 39–61 41
2. Logics DL1−5 for deontic operators O1−51
Let our basic logic be propositional logic PL. The alphabet of the language L[PL]
has a set of proposition letters Prop = p1,p2, . . . , truth-functional operators ‘¬’, ‘∧’, ‘∨’,
‘→’, ‘↔’ and brackets ‘(’, ‘)’. The set of sentences is defined as usual. ∧, ∨ in front
of sets of sentences means their conjunction and disjunction, and, e.g., ∧ni=1 Ai further
abbreviates
∧{Ai, . . . ,An}. In the semantics, valuation functions v : Prop → {1,0} define
the truth of sentences A ∈L[PL] as usual, ‖A‖ meaning the set of valuations v that make
A true. 	 means an arbitrary tautology, and ⊥ an arbitrary contradiction. We suppose a
sound and complete axiomatic system for PL.
In this section, we examine deontic logics DLi1 for operators Oi,1  i  5, defined
above. The upper index in the system name (and the names of most axiom schemes) indi-
cates the type of operator used, and the subscript indicates that the scope of Oi is L[PL],
not a deontic language (in Section 7 we give up this restriction). The alphabet of languages
L[DLi1], 1 i  5, is like L[PL] except for one additional operator Oi . L[DLi1] is then
the smallest set such that
(a) if A ∈L[PL] then A ∈L[DLi1],
(b) if A ∈L[PL] then OiA ∈L[DLi1], and
(c) if A, B ∈L[DLi1], so are ¬A, (A ∧B), (A ∨B), (A → B), and (A ↔ B).
Note that we permit ‘mixed’ expressions like ‘p1 → O1p2’. The axiomatic systems DLi1
are then defined by the following clauses (we write DLi1 A for A ∈ DL
i
1):
(a) All L[DLi1]-instances of PL-tautologies are in DLi1.
(b) DLi1 is closed under modus ponens and the following rule:
(Exti1) If PL A ↔ B then DLi1 O
iA ↔ OiB , 2 i  5.
(c) For all A, B ∈L[PL] (	 being an arbitrary tautology):
(Mi1) DLi1 O
i(A ∧B) → (OiA ∧OiB), 3 i  5,
(Ci1) DLi1 (O
iA ∧OiB) → Oi(A ∧B), 4 i  5,
(Ni1) DLi1 O
i	, i = 5.
As usual, a set of sentences Γ ⊆L[DLi1] is DLi1-inconsistent iff there are A1, . . . ,An
in Γ, n 1, such that DLi1 (A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An) → ⊥, and Γ is DL
i
1-consistent otherwise.
A sentence A ∈L[DLi1] is DLi1-derivable from a set Γ ⊆L[DLi1] (we write Γ DLi1 A) iff
Γ ∪{¬A} is DLi1-inconsistent. If ¬A is derivable from the empty set, A is called refutable.
For the semantics, let v be as before, and I be a set of PL-sentences. The truth-
definitions of DLi1-sentences are relative to v and I , where the truth of a proposition letter
is defined as before, and the truth of OiA is defined with respect to I as given in Section 1,
truth-definitions for Boolean operators being as usual. VerDLi1(I, v) denotes the subset of
DLi1-sentences defined true for I , v, and we write I , v |= A for A ∈ VerDLi1(I, v). A is
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DLi -valid (we write |= i A) iff A ∈L[DLi ] is true for arbitrary I , v, and Γ ⊆L[DLi ]1 DL1 1 1
DLi1-entails A (we write Γ |=DLi1 A) iff I , v |= A for all I , v such that I , v |= B for all
B ∈ Γ. If there is a pair I , v such that I , v |= B for all B ∈ Γ ⊆ L[DLi1], we call Γ
DLi1-satisfiable. Note that Boolean valuations v are introduced just to give non-deontic
formulae their usual interpretation, and the set of sentences I is not made relative to one
such valuation. If imperatives are meant to arise in specific circumstances only, this is a
matter of proper representation of (conditional) imperatives, for which here no means are
provided. So for example p1 → O1p2 states that either ¬p1 is true, or that p2 is what
some imperative demands, regardless of the situation.
Theorem 2.1. Each system DLi1,1 i  5, is sound and complete.
Proof. Soundness is trivial with respect to the truth definitions employed. For complete-
ness, we prove equivalently that if Γ is DLi1-consistent then Γ is DL
i
1-satisfiable:
Let A1, A2, . . . be a fixed enumeration of L[DLi1]. Let ∆ =
⋃
n ∆n, where ∆0 = Γ,
and
∆n+1 =
{
∆n ∪ {An+1}, if this is consistent,
∆n ∪ {¬An+1}, otherwise.
Clearly each ∆n must be DLi1-consistent with either An+1 or ¬An+1, hence (i) ∆ is DLi1-
consistent, (ii) for all A ∈L[DLi1] either A ∈ ∆ or ¬A ∈ ∆. Now we define:
v =
{
1, if p ∈ ∆,
0, otherwise, I = {A | O
iA ∈ ∆}.
We prove I, v |= A iff A ∈ ∆ by induction on A. We only give the case for A = OiB , the
others are trivial: Suppose OiB ∈ ∆. Then B ∈ I and for all operators Oi , I, v |= OiB.
Suppose OiB /∈ ∆, so ¬OiB ∈ ∆:
i = 1: Assume I, v |= O1B , so B ∈ I, so O1B ∈ ∆, but then ∆ is DL11-inconsistent.
i = 2: Assume I, v |= O2B , so there is a C ∈ I such that |=PL B ↔ C. So O2C ∈ ∆.
But from (Ext21) and PL-completeness we have DL21 O
2B ↔ O2C, so ∆ is DL21-
inconsistent.
i = 3: Assume I, v |= O3B , so there is a C ∈ I such that |=PL C → B, so O3C ∈ ∆.
But from (Ext31), (M
3
1), and PL-completeness we have DL31 O
3C → O3B , so ∆
is DL31-inconsistent.
i = 4: Assume I, v |= O4B , so there is a non-empty finite set {C1, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ I such that
|=PL (C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cn) → B. So {O4C1, . . . ,O4Cn} ⊂ ∆. But from (Ext41), (C41),
(M41), and PL-completeness we obtain DL41 (O
4C1 ∧ · · · ∧ O4Cn) → O4B, so
∆ is DL41-inconsistent.
i = 5: Assume I, v |= O5B , so I |=PL B. If I = ∅, then by strong completeness of PL
there is a non-empty finite set {C1, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ I such that |=PL (C1 ∧· · ·∧Cn) →
B , so the r.a.a. is done as in case i = 4. If I = ∅ then DL51 O
5B by (Ext51), (N41),
so ∆ is DL51-inconsistent. 
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3. Combined logics DLOp for operators O1−51
The definitions of operators O1−5 all refer to a set I . Instead of having languages
L[DLi1] that make use of just one of these operators, it makes sense to permit mixed state-
ments such as ‘O4p1 ∧ ¬O3p1’ which expresses that though p1 is not implied by what a
single imperative demands, it is implied by a finite subset of all imperative demands. So let
Op be a subset of operator indices {1,2,3,4,5}, card(Op) > 1, and let L[DLOp1 ] be like
L[DLi1] except that the alphabet contains all of Oi, i ∈ Op, and clause b) in the definition
of sentences now reads
b) if A ∈L[PL] then OiA ∈L[DLOp1 ], for all i ∈ Op.
Let the description of systems DLOp1 follow that of DL
i
1, where the clause a) is now
relative to the language L[DLOp1 ], and clauses b), c) hold for all i ∈ Op satisfying the
additional requirements. We have the following additional axiom schemes:
(OiOj ) DLOp1 O
iA → OjA, {i, j } ⊆ Op, i < j ,
(O3O2) DLOp1 O
3⊥ → O2⊥, {2,3} ⊆ Op,
(O4O3) DLOp1 O
4	 → O3	, {3,4} ⊆ Op,
(O5O3) if PL A then DLOp1 O
5A → O3	, {3,5} ⊆ Op,
(O5O4) if PL A then DLOp1 O
5A → O4A, {4,5} ⊆ Op.
Theorem 3.1. All systems DLOp1 are sound and weakly complete.
Proof. Soundness is again trivial with respect to Oi -truth definitions. For weak complete-
ness, we have to prove that if DLOp1 A then DLOp1 A. We assume DLF1 A so ¬A is not
refutable in DLOp1 . One disjunct δ in a disjunctive normal form of ¬A is then not refutable
in DLOp1 . From the non-deontic conjuncts of δ we obtain a valuation v that satisfies them.
As for the deontic conjuncts, for all i ∈ Op let Oi = {B ∈L[PL] | OiB is a conjunct of
δ}, and Qi = {B ∈L[PL] | ¬OiB is a conjunct of δ}. Let π1,π2 be proposition letters that
do not occur in δ. We define
I = O1 1 ∈ Op (a)
∪ {(B ∧ (π1 ∨ ¬π1)) | B ∈ O2} 2 ∈ Op (b)
∪ {(B ∧ π1) | B ∈ O3} 3 ∈ Op (c)
∪ {π2, (π2 → (B ∧ π1)) | B ∈ O4} 4 ∈ Op (d)
∪ {π2, (π2 → (B ∧ π1)) | B ∈ O5 and PL B} 5 ∈ Op (e).
Obviously, for all B ∈ Oi , I, v OiB . We prove that for each B ∈ Qi , I, v ¬OiB:
B ∈ Q1: If B ∈ I then B /∈ O1 by PL-consistency of δ. But all other B ∈ I contain propo-
sition letter π1 not occurring in any B ∈ Q1.
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B ∈ Q2: For all C ∈ I by clause (a) or (b), PL (B ↔ C) by PL-consistency of δ and
axiom scheme (O1O2). All other C ∈ I derive some contingent formula π2 or
(π2 → π1). Since B contains no occurrence of π1,π2, if PL B → C then PL
¬B . The C ∈ I generated by clauses (d), (e) all are contingently true or false,
so if there is a C ∈ I such that PL ¬C it must be due to clause (c). But then
O3CDLOp1 -derives O2C by (O3O2) and O2C DL
Op
1 -derives O2B by (Ext
2
1), so
δ is DLOp1 -refutable.
B ∈ Q3: For all C ∈ I by clause (a), (b), or (c), PL (C → B) by PL-consistency of δ and
axiom schemes (O1O3), (O2O3), (M31), (Ext
3
1). So only by virtue of clauses (d),
(e) can there be a C ∈ I such that PL (C → B). But no single C generated by
these clauses PL-implies B unless PL B . But then there is some conjunct O4C
in δ, or some conjunct O5D with non-tautological D, from which DLOp1 -derives
O3C by use of (O5O3) or (O4O3), (M41), (Ext
4
1). So δ is DL
Op
1 -refutable.
B ∈ Q4: If O4B is true, then I = ∅, Oi = ∅ for some i ∈ Op. By the construction
PL
∧
I → B iff PL ∧(⋃4i=1 Oi ∪ {C ∈ O5 |PL C}) → B . For any C in⋃4
i=1 Oi ∪ {C ∈ O5 |PL C} we derive O4C by (OiO4), i ∈ Op, and O5B using
(M41), (Ext
4
1), so δ is DL
Op
1 -refutable.
B ∈ Q5: If PL B then δ is DLOp1 -refutable by (N51), so again I = ∅, Oi = ∅ for some
i ∈ Op. The proof relies on axiom schemes (OiO5), i ∈ Op, and is done as in
case Q4. 
Theorem 3.2. No DLOp1 , Op = {4,5}, is strongly complete.
Proof. The semantics of DLOp1 for Op = {4,5} is not compact, i.e., there are finitely
satisfiable sets Γ ⊆L[DLOp1 ] such that Γ is not satisfiable: Suppose {i, j } ⊆ Op. We give
non-satisfiable sets Γ and an If for each finite Γf ⊆ Γ such that If , v satisfies Γf , v being
arbitrary.
i = 1, j = 2: Let Γ = {¬O1A ||=PL A ↔ p1} ∪ {O2p1}. For any finite subset Γf of Γ
there is a proposition letter π that does not occur in any A ∈ Γf . Each set Γf is
satisfied by If = {((π ∨ ¬π)∧ p1)}.
i = 1,2, j = 3: Let Γ = {¬OiA ||=PL A → p1} ∪ {O3p1}. Let Γf be any finite subset,
and π be as before. Each set Γf is satisfied by If = {(π ∧ p1)}.
i = 1,2,3, j = 4,5: Let Γ = {¬OiA PL A} ∪ {Ojp1}. Let Γf be any finite subset, and
π be as before. Each set Γf is satisfied by If = {(π → p1),π}. 
Theorem 3.3. DL{4,5}1 is (strongly) complete.
Proof. We adapt the completeness proof of DL41 in Theorem 2.1: ∆ is now defined with
respect to an enumeration of DL{4,5}1 -sentences and DL
{4,5}
1 -consistency. I , v is constructed
as for DL41, in particular I = {A | O4A ∈ ∆}. The proof that I , v |= O4A iff O4A ∈ ∆ is as
before. To prove that I, v |= O5A iff O5A ∈ ∆, assume first O5A ∈ ∆. Either O4A ∈ ∆,
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but then A ∈ I , and I |=PL A is trivial. Or O4A /∈ ∆, then ¬O4A ∈ ∆, but then A must
be tautological, for otherwise by use of (O5O4) the finite subset {¬O4A,O5A} ⊆ ∆ is
DL{4,5}1 -inconsistent. So |=PL A and I, v |= O5A is true. For the other direction assume
O5A /∈ ∆, so ¬O5A ∈ ∆. For r.a.a. assume I, v |= O5A, so I |=PL A. If I = ∅ then I, v |=
O4A, so by completeness of PL O4A ∈ ∆, but then due to (O4O5) the set {¬O5A,O4A}
is DL{4,5}1 -inconsistent. If I = ∅ then A is tautological, so by using (N51), (Ext51){¬O5A}
is DL{4,5}1 -inconsistent. 
4. DLi1-logics and semantic restrictions
So far, a set of sentences has been used to model what a set of imperatives demands,
there being neither restrictions on the size of I , nor restrictions on the logical type of
sentences in I . But concerning the size of I , it may be argued that a deontic logic should
be applied only if there is at least one demand to be considered, since reasoning about what
one ought to do when nothing is explicitly obligatory seems a borderline case. Concerning
the elements of I , it may be argued that imperatives that demand the logically impossible
or logically necessary are not ‘proper’, and one may also want to use a ‘rationality restraint’
to the effect that what the imperatives demand should be (jointly) satisfiable. Consider the
following restrictions:
[R-0] I = ∅ (Non-Triviality),
[R-1] ∀A ∈ I :BL ¬A (Excluded Impossibility),
[R-2] I BL ⊥ (Collective Satisfiability),
[R-3] ∀A ∈ I :BL A (Excluded Necessity).
Consider the logics DLi1 defined in Section 2 and the following additional axiom
schemes:
(XIi1) if PL ¬A then DLi1 ¬O
iA,
(Di1) if PL ¬(A1 ∧ · · · ∧An) then DLi1 ¬(O
iA1 ∧ · · · ∧OiAn),
(XNi1) if PL A then DLi1 ¬O
iA.
Warranted by the following theorems, the table below lists, for languages L[DLi1],
1 i  5, axiom systems sound and complete with respect to DLi1-semantics conforming
to any of the above restrictions individually (square brackets indicate weak completeness
only):
L[DLi1] i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4 i = 5
[R-0] [DLi1] DLi1 + (Ni1) DL51
[R-1] DLi1 + (XIi1) DLi1
[R-2] DLi1 + (Di1)
[R-3] DLi1 + (XNi1) [DLi1] DL51
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Theorem 4.1. The following systems are sound and (strongly) complete:1. DLi1 + (Ni1) for DLi1-semantics restricted by [R-0], i = 3,4.
2. DL51 for DL51-semantics restricted by [R-0].
3. DLi1 + (XIi1) for DLi1-semantics restricted by [R-1], i = 1,2,3.
4. DLi1 for DLi1-semantics restricted by [R-1], i = 4,5.
5. DLi1 + (Di1) for DLi1-semantics restricted by [R-2], i = 1,2,3,4,5.
6. DLi1 + (XNi1) for DLi1-semantics restricted by [R-3], i = 1,2.
7. DL51 for DL51-semantics restricted by [R-3].
Proof. Soundness is again obvious. The completeness proofs are forthcoming adaptations
of that for the DLi1-systems. When there is a specific axiom, it obviously ensures that the
constructed I conforms to the given restriction. Consider cases 2,4,7 where there are no
specific axioms:
Case 2: O5	 ∈ ∆ by (N51), so by the construction 	 ∈ I = ∅.
Case 4: We construct ∆ as before, but now define I = {A | OiA ∈ ∆ and PL ¬A}. Sup-
pose OiA ∈ ∆ and A /∈ I , so |=PL ¬A. Then |=PL A → p1, |=PL A → ¬p1,
so by (Exti1) we have Oip,Oi¬p1 ∈ ∆, so {p1,¬p1} ⊆ I, so I |=PL A. The
remainder is as before.
Case 7: Let ∆ be as before, but now I = {A | O5A ∈ ∆ and PL A}. Suppose O5A ∈ ∆
and A /∈ I , so |=PL A. But then trivially I |=PL A, and the remainder of the proof
is as before. 
Theorem 4.2. DLi1-semantics, i = 1,2, is not compact if restricted by [R-0]. DLi1-
semantics, i = 3,4, is not compact if restricted by [R-3].
Proof. To show that DLi1-semantics, i = 1,2, is not compact if restricted by [R-0], let
Γ = {¬OiA | A ∈L[DLi1]}. To satisfy all of Γ, I must be empty, which is excluded by
[R-0], so Γ is not satisfiable by [R-0]-restricted semantics. But any finite subset Γf ⊆ Γ
is satisfied by If , v, where If = {π}, and π is a proposition letter that does not occur in
any A ∈ Γf , v being arbitrary.
For the proof that DLi1-semantics, i = 3,4, is not compact if restricted by [R-3], let
Γ = {¬OiA PL A} ∪ {Oi	}. To satisfy all of Γ, I must contain tautologies only, which
is excluded by [R-3], yet it also cannot be empty due to the expected truth of Oi	, so Γ
is not satisfiable by [R-3]-restricted semantics. But any Γf is again satisfied by If , v, as
described above. 
Theorem 4.3. The following systems are sound and weakly complete:
1. DLi1 for DLi1-semantics restricted by [R-0], i = 1,2.
2. DLi1 for DLi1-semantics restricted by [R-3], i = 3,4.
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Proof. Soundness is again obvious. For weak completeness, suppose {A} is DLi -1
consistent. To demonstrate that there are I, v such that I, v A, we do a construction as in
the proof of Theorem 3.1, i.e., form a disjunctive normal form of A, from the non-deontic
conjuncts of a non-refutable disjunct obtain a valuation v that satisfies these, and from the
deontic conjuncts construct sets Oi and Qi as before. Again, let π be a proposition letter
not occurring in A.
Case 1: Let
I =
{
Oi , if Oi = ∅,
{π}, otherwise.
The construction ensures that I = ∅ (R-0), and for all B ∈ Oi , I, v  OiB . If i = 1 and
B ∈ Q1, then B /∈ O1 by PL-consistency of {A}, and B = π since π does not occur in A,
so B /∈ I and I, v ¬O1B . If i = 2 and B ∈ Q2, then no C ∈ O2 is PL-equivalent to B due
to (Ext21) and PL-consistency of {A}, and no formula not containing π is PL-equivalent
to π . So there is no C ∈ I s.t. PL (B ↔ C), and I, v ¬O2B .
Case 2: Let
I =


Oi − {A ∈L[PL] |PL A}, if this is non-empty,
{π}, otherwise and if Qi ∩ {A ∈L[PL] |PL A} = ∅,
∅, otherwise.
Obviously I contains no tautological element (R-3). Suppose B ∈ Oi . If there is a non-
tautological C ∈ Oi , for all B ∈ Oi , tautological or non-tautological, I, v OiB . If there
are tautological B ∈ Oi (only), there cannot be a tautological C ∈ Qi due to (Exti1) and
PL-consistency of {A}, so π ∈ I and again I, v OiB . For each B ∈ Qi , I, v ¬OiB:
B ∈ Q3: If there is a tautological C ∈ Q3, O3 = ∅ due to (Ext31), (M31) and PL-consistency
of {A}, and I = ∅ by the above construction, so I, v  ¬O3B . Otherwise, no
C ∈ O3 PL-implies B again due to (Ext31), (M31) and PL-consistency of {A}, and
if π does then B is tautological, but this was excluded.
B ∈ Q4: As before, if C ∈ Q4 is tautological then O4 = ∅ and I = ∅, so I, v  ¬O4B .
Otherwise, B is neither implied by any {C1, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ O4 due to (Ext41), (M41),
(C41) and PL-consistency of {A}, nor by I = {π} since a tautological B was ex-
cluded. 
If the semantics employs more than one of the above restrictions, then generally there is
a sound and (strongly) complete axiomatic system iff each of the semantics with just one
of these restrictions has such a system, and the axiomatic system is obtained by including
all axioms and rules of the systems for the singularly restricted semantics. However, this
rule fails in one case:
Theorem 4.4. DL51-semantics is not compact if restricted by [R-0], [R-3].
Proof. To show incompactness, let Γ = {¬O5A PL A}. To satisfy all of Γ, I cannot
contain anything but tautologies, which is excluded by [R-3], yet it also cannot be empty
due to [R-0], so Γ is not satisfiable by [R-0][R-3]-restricted semantics. But any finite
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subset Γf is again satisfied by If , v, where If = {π}, π being as before, and v being
arbitrary. 
Theorem 4.5. DL51 is sound and weakly complete for [R-0][R-3]-restricted DL51-sem-
antics.
Proof. Soundness is again obvious. For completeness we assume that {A} is DL51-
consistent and construct an I, v such that I, v  A as in the proof of Theorem 4.3, now
letting
I =
{
Oi − {A ∈L[PL] |PL A}, if this is non-empty,
{π}, otherwise.
Obviously I satisfies [R-0] and [R-3]. For all B ∈ O5, if B is non-tautological then B ∈ I
and I, v O5B , and trivially so if B is tautological. Suppose B ∈ Q5: B cannot be tauto-
logical due to (N41) and PL-consistency of {A}, so also B cannot be PL-implied by {π},
so if I PL B by completeness of PL there must be some {C1, . . . ,Cn} ⊆ O5 such that
PL ((C1 ∧· · ·∧Cn) → B), but this is excluded by (Ext41), (M41), (C41) and PL-consistency
of {A}. 
5. Van Fraassen’s imperative logic
Van Fraassen [21] discusses three truth definitions of O-operators with respect to given
imperatives. For all these operators, axiom scheme (C) does not hold, for van Fraassen is
concerned with possibly conflicting imperatives, and argues that when there is a demand
for A, and a demand for ¬A, we should admit the truth of OA ∧O¬A, but the derivation
of O(A∧ ¬A) should be blocked. In van Fraassen’s semantics, to each imperative i there
is a class of possible outcomes i+ in which i is fulfilled. His first definition reads:
[Df-F1] OA is true iff, for some imperative i that is in force, i+ is part of the set of
possible outcomes in which A is true.
In the terms used here, van Fraassen’s definition may be reformulated as
[Df-F1∗] I |= OA iff ∃B ∈ I :|=PL B → A.
Since van Fraassen also presupposes that no single imperative may be impossible to
fulfill, van Fraassen’s first logic coincides with DL31 + (XI31) above. However, van Fraassen
thinks definition [Df-F1] too ‘simple minded’, for two reasons: For one, imperatives are
conditional, and according to van Fraassen a conditional imperative can be fulfilled or
violated only if its condition is the case. His second logic therefore introduces conditional
imperatives and a corresponding dyadic O-operator. I leave this definition aside, since we
are not concerned with conditional imperatives here. The other argument against [Df-F1]
is that it should be allowed to draw conclusions from imperatives that do not conflict,
e.g., from two imperatives that demand p1 ∨ p2 and ¬p2 respectively conclude that p1
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is obligatory. But since there is no single imperative that demands p1, [Df-F1] does not
allow the derivation of Op1. Van Fraassen therefore introduces the notion of a score of an
outcome v, i.e., the set of imperatives that v fulfills, and defines:
[Df-F3] OA is true iff there is a possible state of affairs v in ‖A‖ whose score is not
included in the score of any v′ in ‖¬A‖.
Again, this definition may be reformulated in the terms used here:
[Df-F3∗] I |= OFA iff ∃v ∈ ‖A‖: ∀v′ ∈ ‖¬A‖: {B ∈ I | v |= B}  {B ∈ I | v′ |= B}.
Let the set of maximally PL-consistent subsets I −⊥ of I be the set of subsets I ′ ⊆ I such
that (i) I ′  ⊥, and (ii) there is no I ′′ such that I ′ ⊂ I ′′ ⊆ I and I ′′  ⊥. It can then be
proven that [Df-F3∗] is equivalent to [Df-F3∗∗] (cf. Horty [12, p. 30, Theorem 2]):
[Df-F3∗∗] I |= OFA iff ∃I ′ ∈ I − ⊥: I ′ PL A.
Let the language L[DLF1 ] be like any of the L[DLi1], except that OF replaces Oi in
all DLi1-sentences. Let the axiomatic system DL
F
1 be like DL
3
1 + (XI31) + (N31), except
that OF replaces O3. Let DLF1 -semantics be defined like DL
3
1-semantics, except that truth
definition [Df-F3∗∗] replaces that for O3. We then have the following results:
Theorem 5.1. DLF1 is sound and weakly complete.
Proof. Concerning soundness, the validity of (Ext1F1 ), (MF1 ), (XI
F
1 ) and (NF1 ) is imme-
diate. Concerning (weak) completeness, we have to prove that if DLF1 A then DLF1 A. We
assume DLF1
A so ¬A is not refutable in DLF1 . As before (cf. Theorem 3.1), let δ be a
non-refutable disjunct in a disjunctive normal form of ¬A. From its non-deontic conjuncts
we again obtain a valuation v that satisfies these. Concerning the deontic conjuncts of δ,
let OF be the set of PL-sentences B such that OFB is a conjunct of δ, and QF be the set
of PL-sentences B such that ¬OFB is a conjunct of δ. For any set Γ ⊆L[PL] let
minPLΓ = {A ∈ Γ | ∀B ∈ Γ : if PL B → A then PL B ↔ A}.
Let n = card(minPLOF ). Let {π1, . . . , πn} ⊂ Prop be an arbitrary set of n proposition
letters not occurring in δ, and σ be a function that maps minPLOF onto the set {π1,¬π1 ∧
π2, . . . ,¬π1 ∧ · · ·¬πn−1 ∧ πn} of n mutually exclusive PL-sentences. We then define:
I = {B ∧ σ(B) | B ∈ minPLOF }.
Note that I − ⊥ = {{i} | i ∈ I }, since σ(B) is PL-inconsistent with any σ(C), B,C ∈
minPLOF and B = C. No B ∈ OF is a contradiction due to (XIF1 ), and for each consistent
B ∈ OF the definition of minPLOF ensures that there is an I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ such that I PL B ,
so OFB is true. Suppose B ∈ QF but I, v  OFB , so there is an I ′ ∈ I − ⊥: I ′ PL B .
Then there is a C ∈ minPLOF such that I ′ = {C ∧ σ(C)} and PL C ∧ σ(C) → B . Since
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σ(C) contains no sentence letters occurring in either B or C, PL C → B . But then ¬OFC
DLF1 -derives from ¬OFB by (MF1 ), (ExtF1 ), so δ is DLF1 -inconsistent. 
Theorem 5.2. There is no strongly complete axiomatic system DLF1 .
Proof. Let
Γ = {OFp1,OFp2,¬OF(p1 ∧ p2),¬OF¬p1,¬OF¬(p1 ∧ p2),
¬OF¬(p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3), . . .
}
.
Γ is finitely satisfiable: Let π be a proposition letter that does not occur in some sentence of
a finite Γf ⊂ Γ . Then I = {p1 ∧ π,p2 ∧ ¬π} satisfies Γf . However, Γ is not satisfiable:
Suppose there is a set I that satisfies Γ . OFp1,OFp2 ∈ Γ , so there are PL-consistent
finite sets Γ1,Γ2 ⊆ I that derive p1 and p2 respectively. Γ1 ∪ Γ2 is inconsistent, since
otherwise there is some I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ such that Γ1 ∪ Γ2 ⊆ I ′ and I ′  p1 ∧ p2, so I would
not satisfy ¬OF (p1 ∧ p2). Now PL (∧Γ1 ∧ p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn) → ⊥ for any n 1, for
otherwise Γ1 PL ¬(p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn) would contradict ¬OF¬(p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn). The same
holds for Γ2. Let n be the highest index of proposition letters occurring in Γ2. Since Γ2 ∪
{p1,p2, . . . , pn} is PL-consistent, i.e., (p1 ∧· · ·∧pn) is the first disjunct in the disjunctive
normal form of
∧
Γ2, we have PL (∧Γ2 ∧ p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn) ↔ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn). So we
obtain PL (
∧
Γ1 ∧∧Γ2 ∧ p1 ∧ · · · ∧ pn) → ⊥. But Γ1 ∪ Γ2 was PL-inconsistent. 
After explaining that semantics based on [Df-F3] satisfies the ‘basic criteria’ (the axiom
schemes of DL31 + (XI31), van Fraassen notes that in the semantics we have the following
additional truth: If there are two imperatives i1, i2 in force, and if there is a v that belongs
to i+1 and also to i
+
2 , then if [all such] v ∈ ‖A‖, OFA is true. He then asks:
“But can this happy circumstance be reflected in the logic of the ought-statements alone?
Or can it be expressed only in a language in which we can talk directly about the im-
peratives as well? This is an important question because it is the question whether the
inferential structure of the ‘ought’ language game can be stated in so simple a manner
that it can be grasped in and by itself.”
If what van Fraassen means by ‘the logic of the ought-statements alone’ is a monotonic
axiomatic system, then van Fraassen’s first question deserves a negative answer: There is
a logic of ought-statements DLF1 that is weakly complete, but the only additional truth if
compared to [Df-F1] is OF	.3 In particular, DLF1 does not provide the inferences van
Fraassen desires. And Theorem 5.2 shows that there is no strongly complete axiomatic
3 Van Fraassen seems to have overlooked the additional truth of OF	. To avoid its truth, the O5-type defini-
tion [Df-F3∗∗] may be changed into a more O4-type definition:
I |= OFA iff ∃I ′ ∈ I −⊥: ∃B1, . . . ,Bn ∈ I ′ |=BL B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bn → A.
It can then be shown that DL31 + (XI31 ) is sound and weakly complete with respect to the changed definition, and
the counterexample in Theorem 5.2 again disproves compactness.
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system in terms of the O-operator used. But, regarding his additional question, it seems to
me that the “ought language game” extends to operators like O1 or O2 that more “directly
talk about imperatives”. So perhaps a more powerful language can provide the missing
inferences. It is immediate that the counterexample used in Theorem 3.2 to disprove com-
pactness of DL{2,4}1 also disproves compactness of any semantics that employs operators
of type O1 or O2 in addition to van Fraassen’s operator OF . So for an improved char-
acterization of van Fraassen’s third semantics it must suffice to give a weakly complete
system:
Let L[DL{2,F }1 ] be the language that is like L[DL{2,3}1 ] except that OF replaces O3 in
all DL{2,3}1 -sentences. For the semantics, the truth of O2, OF is defined with respect to a
set I as above, and for proposition letters and Boolean connectives it is defined as usual.
Let the axiomatic system DL{2,F }1 contain all instances of L[DL{2,F }1 ] in PL-theorems, be
closed under modus ponens and (Ext21), (Ext
F
1 ), contain all L[PL]-instances in the axiom
schemes (MF1 ), (XI
F
1 ), (NF1 ) of DL
F
1 , and in the following schemes:
(F-1) If PL ¬∧ni=1 Ai then DL{2,F }1
∧n
i=1 O2Ai → OF
∧n
i=1 Ai ,
(F-2) DL{2,F } (
∧n
i=1 O2Ai ∧OFB ∧ ¬OF (B ∧
∧n
i=1 Ai)) → OF(B ∧ ¬
∧n
i=1 Ai).
According to (F-1), agglomeration of contents of O2-obligations is admissible if these
are jointly PL-consistent.4 (F-2) then states that if O2-contents may not be added to the
content of an OF -obligation, then there is an obligation to the contrary that goes with that
content. So (F-1) and (F-2) now properly define the ‘simple cases’, where agglomeration
of contents is admissible.
Theorem 5.3. DL{2,F }1 is sound and weakly complete.
Proof. For soundness of the new axiom schemes, validity of (F-1) is immediate from the
fact that if there are B1, . . . ,Bn ∈ I equivalent to A1, . . . ,An respectively, and A1, . . . ,An
are PL-consistent, then some I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ contains {B1, . . . ,Bn}, so I ′ PL A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An.
For the validity of (F-2), suppose O2A1, . . . ,O2An. If ¬OF(B ∧∧ni=1 Ai), then no I ′ ∈
I −⊥ may derive B and all Ai, so if OFB is true and there is an I ′ that derives B , it must
be inconsistent with
∧n
i=1 Ai and consequently derive B ∧ ¬
∧n
i=1 Ai .
For (weak) completeness, we have to prove that if A is DL{2,F }1 -valid, then A ∈ DL{2,F }1 .
We assume A /∈ DL{2,F }1 , so ¬A is not refutable in DL{2,F }1 . As now usual, let δ be a non-
refutable disjunct in a disjunctive normal form of ¬A. From its non-deontic conjuncts we
4 A difficulty in axiomatizing van Fraassen’s semantics was pointed out by Horty [11, p. 50]: If background
imperatives are coded into ought-statements, as they are here using operator O2, then the set {O2A | A ∈L[BL]}
must derive OFB for any BL-consistent B, though for some basic logics like first order logic these are not recur-
sively enumerable. But then due to (F-1) the set of DL{2,F }1 -axioms is not decidable and DL
{2,F }
1 not recursively
enumerable, so for such basic logics no axiomatization in the usual sense is provided here.
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again obtain a valuation v that satisfies them. As for the deontic conjuncts of δ, first letO2 = {B ∈L[PL] | O2B is a conjunct of δ},
Q2 = {B ∈L[PL] | ¬O2B is a conjunct of δ}.
Let L[PL]δ be the set of PL-sentences that contain only proposition letters occurring in
some deontic conjunct of δ. Let r(L[PL]δ) be a set of 22n mutually non-equivalent rep-
resentatives of L[PL]δ , n being the number of proposition letters occurring in the deontic
conjuncts of δ. By writing PL-sentences we now mean their unique representatives in
L[PL]∆. We construct a finite set ∆ with the following properties:
(a) If OFB,¬OFC are conjuncts of δ, then OFB,¬OFC are in ∆.
(b) For all B ∈ r(L[PL]δ), either OFB ∈ ∆ or ¬OFB ∈ ∆.
(c) {δ} ∪ ∆ is DL{2,F }1 -consistent.
In (a), we may have to replace B,C by r(L[PL]δ)-equivalents using (ExtF1 ).
Let:
OF = {B ∈L[PL] | OFB ∈ ∆},
QF = {B ∈L[PL] | ¬OFB ∈ ∆}.
Lemma 5.1. For all B ∈ O2: (a) if PL ¬B then there is a C ∈ minPLOF such that PL
C → B , and (b) for all C ∈ minPLOF , if {B,C} is PL-consistent, then PL C → B .
Proof. (a) is immediate from (F-1) and the definition of minPLOF (cf. the proof of Theo-
rem 5.1). Concerning (b), either OF(B ∧ C) ∈ ∆ or ¬OF(B ∧ C) ∈ ∆ (clause (b) in the
construction of ∆). If OF(B ∧C) ∈ ∆ then PL C ↔ (B ∧C) by definition of minPLOF ,
so PL C → B . If ¬OF(B ∧ C) ∈ ∆ then O2B,OFC,¬OF(B ∧ C) DL{2,F }1 -derives
OF(¬B ∧ C) by use of (F-2), so OF(¬B ∧ C) ∈ ∆ by clause (c) in the construction
of ∆. But then PL C ↔ (¬B ∧ C) by definition of minPLOF , so {B,C} is not PL-
consistent. 
Let σ : minPLOF →L[PL] be the function defined in the proof of Theorem 5.1. Let
I = O2 ∪ {B ∧ σ(B) | B ∈ minPLOF }.
Lemma 5.2. For all I ′ ∈ I − ⊥, B ∈ L[PL]δ: if I ′ = ∅ and I ′ PL B then there is a
C ∈ minPLOF such that PL C → B .
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5.1, the construction of I , and the fact that σ(C) contains
no proposition letters occurring in B or C. 
It remains to prove that I satisfies all deontic formulas in δ and ∆:
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O2: For all B ∈ O2 we have B ∈ I , so O2B is true.
Q2: For all B ∈ Q2, if C ∈ I and PL B ↔ C, then C /∈ O2, for otherwise δ is
refutable by (Ext21). All other C ∈ I derive some πi not occurring in δ, but no
B ∈ Q2 does.
OF : Unless B ∈ OF is a contradiction, which is excluded by (XIF1 ) and DL{2,F }1 -
consistency of ∆, by definition of minPLOF and the construction of I there is
a I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ such that I ′ PL B , so OFB is true.
QF : For all B ∈ QF , there is no I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ such that I ′ PL B: For otherwise there
is a C ∈ minPLOF such that PL C → B (Lemma 5.2). Then OFC ∈ ∆, and
¬OFC ∈ ∆ due to (ExtF1 ), (MF1 ), so ∆ is DL{2,F }1 -inconsistent. 
6. Saving a twin without guilt—the sceptical ought OS
In the long-standing philosophical dispute on the existence of moral dilemma and
conflicting obligations, Barcan Marcus [16] provided the following Buridan’s ass type ex-
ample: Identical twins are in danger of being crushed to death by a rock. They are pinned
down such that only one can be pulled free at a time. If nothing is done, the rock will
soon kill them both, but if either twin is removed this will cause the rock to slide and
kill the other. A mountain guide is liable for the lives of both twins. What are her obliga-
tions?
As the example is set up, it suggests the co-existence of two conflicting obligations,
i.e., the guide has to save one twin (T1), and also save the other (T2), T1 contradict-
ing T2. In logics DL41 and DL
5
1 we have O4/5T1 and O4/5T2, and also O4/5t (T1 ∧ T2).
But then a contradiction is obligatory, so we cannot also accept the principle ‘ought im-
plies can’ expressed by (XI4/51 ). In van Fraassen’s logic we maintain O
FT1 and OFT2,
and derivation of OF(T1 ∧ T2) is blocked by the absence of (CF1 ) and inconsistency of
T1 ∧ T2 (axiom F-1). However, in addition we have OF¬T1 and OF¬T2: by saving one
twin the mountain guide will violate her duties towards the other. So why not simply walk
away?
Conee [5], Donagan [6], and Brink [3] have argued that morally there is no conflict:
according to Conee, either act is permitted and neither absolutely obligatory, while for
Donagan and Brink there only exists an obligation to save one twin or the other, but not two
conflicting obligations to save either. Deontically, the dilemma was examined by Jacquette
[13] and Horty [12]. Jaquette points out that van Fraassen’s approach is unsatisfactory,
since it does not hold that an obligatory act is also permitted: OFA → PFA is not a truth
in DLF1 , with PFA defined as ¬OF¬A. So according to van Fraassen’s notion of ought,
either twin must be saved, but can only be saved at the price of guilt (for doing something
forbidden). As an alternative to van Fraassen’s logic, Horty, in accord with Donagan’s and
Brink’s disjunctive proposal, considers a ‘sceptical theory’ of obligations, where something
can be obligatoryS only if there is no consistent set of norms that demand the contrary. With
respect to our semantics, Horty’s definition reads:
[Df-S] I |= OSA iff ∀I ′ ∈ I − ⊥: I ′ PL A.
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So A is obligatory iff all maximally consistent subsets of imperative-associated sentences
derive A.5 Let L[DLS1 ] be like any of the L[DLi1], except that operator OS replaces Oi .
Let the truth of DLS1 -sentences be defined with respect to [Df-S] and the usual definitions
for proposition letters and Boolean connectives. Let DLS1 be like DL
5
1 + (XI51). We then
obtain:
Theorem 6.1. DLS1 is sound and (strongly) complete.
Proof. Immediate. For completeness, ∆ is constructed just as in the proof of Theo-
rem 2.1. 
The result is welcome at first, for it seems that standard deontic logic, including ag-
glomeration (CS1 ) and ‘ought implies can’ (XIS1 ), is the proper tool to represent the sceptic
notion of ought. However, the problem is that now all the problems have disappeared:
Conflicting imperatives and their impact on what is “sceptically obligatory” have become
imperceivable in DLS1 . To see what goes on behind the curtain, and illustrate the relation of
sceptically defined oughts with van Fraassen’s logic, we must again admit the use of more
than one O-operator:
Let the language L[DL{2,F,S}1 ] be like L[DL{2,F }1 ] except that we have the additional
operator OS . The truth of DL{2,F,S}1 -sentences is defined as for DL
{2,F }
1 -sentences with the
additional truth definition [Df-S]. Let the system DL{2,F,S}1 contain all axiom-schemes and
rules of DL{2,F }1 and DL
S
1 , and additionally the following:
(FS-1) (OFA∧ OSB) → OF(A ∧B);
(FS-2) (∧ni=1 O2Ai ∧ ¬OF¬(∧Γ1 →∨kj=2∧Γj )) → OS(∧Γ1 →∨kj=2∧Γj);
(FS-3) (∧ni=1 O2Ai ∧ ¬OF¬∨kj=1∧Γj) → OS∨kj=1∧Γj ;
(FS-4) (∧ni=1 O2Ai ∧ ¬OF ∧ni=1 Ai) → OS¬∧ni=1 Ai .
In FS-2 and FS-3, Γj is a non-empty subset of {A1, . . . ,An}. Note that (FS-3), (FS-4) are
special cases of (FS-2). (FS-3) derives (O2A ∧ O2B ∧ ¬OF¬(A ∨ B)) → OS(A ∨ B),
which is a syntactic version of the disjunctive solution to Marcus’s dilemma: the disjunc-
tion (A ∨ B) of two possibly conflicting imperative demands A, B is obligatory, unless
there is a consistent set of imperatives that demands even ¬A ∧ ¬B . Hence one twin or
5 It might seem awkward that if I contains contradictory imperative demands, e.g., if I = {p1,¬p1,p2} then
with [Df-S] the set of truths is the same as for I ′ = {p2}, i.e., the same as for an I ′ without these demands. If
the fulfillment of one of the demands is to remain obligatory, an alternative would be to have a “disjunction of
oughts” instead of the “ought of a disjunction”, and define:
[Df-DS] VerDS(I, v) := {A ∈L[DL51] | ∀I ′ ∈ I − ⊥: A ∈ VerDL51 (I
′, v)}.
In the above example, (O5p1 ∨O5¬p1) is now true under the new definition, O5(p1 ∨¬p1) remains valid, and
O5⊥ remains false. Ignoring operator indices, we have VerDLS1 (I, v) ⊆ VerDS(I, v) ⊆ VerDL51 (I, v).
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the other must be saved. From (FS-1) and (XIF ) we derive OFA → ¬OS¬A, so what is1
obligatory according to van Fraassen’s ought is at least ‘permitted’ in the sceptical sense. If
guilt is a notion that attaches to a violation of a ‘sceptical ought’ only, then one may save a
twin without guilt, but walking away remains forbidden. From the results of Section 5 it is
immediate that DL{2,F,S}1 cannot be strongly complete. However we obtain the following
result:
Theorem 6.2. DL{2,F,S}1 is sound and weakly complete.
Proof. Concerning soundness, for the validity of (FS-1) assume OFA, so some I ′ ∈ I −⊥
derives A. If OSB is true, then all I ′ ∈ I −⊥ derive B , so I ′ derives A∧B and OF (A∧B)
is true. For the validity of (FS-3) and (FS-4) suppose O2Ai is true for all i, 1  i  n.
Concerning (FS-3), assume ¬OF¬∨kj=1∧Γj , so all I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ are PL-consistent with
at least one disjunct, so all I ′ contain some Γj , 1  j  k, so all I ′ derive
∨k
j=1
∧
Γj .
Concerning (FS-4), assume ¬OS¬∧ni=1 Ai, so some I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ is PL-consistent with∧n
i=1 Ai , so there is some I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ that contains each Ai . For the validity of (FS-2),
assume again O2Ai true for all i, 1  i  n, and assume ¬OF¬(∧Γ1 →∨kj=2∧Γj ).
Those I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ that contain a set Γj also derive ∧Γ1 →∨kj=2∧Γj . Consider an I ′
that does not contain any Γj : Since I ′ is not consistent with all Ai ∈ Γj , it must derive
¬∧Γj for each j , so it derives ¬∨kj=2∧Γj . If I ′ is consistent with Γ1, it derives∧Γ1 ∧
¬∨kj=2∧Γj , but then ¬OF¬(∧Γ1 →∨kj=2∧Γj ) is false. So I ′ must be inconsistent
with Γ1, so it derives ¬∧Γ1 and hence also ∧Γ1 →∨kj=2∧Γj .
For (weak) completeness we use the construction employed in the proof of Theorem 5.3
with the following modifications: ∆ is now defined with respect to DL{2,F,S}1 -consistency
(clause c in the construction of ∆), and additionally we have sets OS and QS :
OS = {B ∈ r(L[PL]δ) | {δ} ∪∆ DL{2,F,S}1 OSB
}
,
QS = {B ∈ r(L[PL]δ) | {δ} ∪∆ DL{2,F,S}1 ¬OSB
}
.
I is constructed as in the proof of Theorem 5.3 and additionally contains the following
elements: Let QS = {B1, . . . ,Bm}. For each Bj we add CI ∧CII ∧CIII to I , where:
– CI =∧OS ,
– CII = ¬∨{∧Γ | Γ ⊆ O2 and Γ ∪ {CI} PL Bj },
– CIII = ¬π1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬πn ∧ ¬πn+1 ∧ · · · ∧ πn+j .
In CIII, π1, . . . , πn are the same proposition letters used to define σ : minPLOF →L[PL]
(cf. the proofs of Theorems 5.1 and 5.3), and πn+1, . . . , πn+m are some other letters not
occurring in δ. We have to prove that the modified I still satisfies all conjuncts of δ. For
the non-deontic conjuncts and conjuncts of the form O2B , ¬O2B , OFB , the proof is as
before. Consider conjuncts of the form ¬OFB , OSB , ¬OSB , and the sets QF , OS , QS :
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QF : For all B ∈ QF , there is no I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ such that I ′ PL B: Due to Lemma 5.1
no I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ can consist of elements of OS alone. If I ′ contains a sentence of
the form C ∧ σ(C), C ∈ minPLOF , I ′ cannot contain any of the new elements
in I , and the proof is as before. Suppose I ′ contains a sentence of the form CI ∧
CII ∧ CIII and I ′ PL B . Let C ∈ QS be the sentence used in the construction of
CI ∧CII ∧CIII. First suppose CII is vacuous, i.e., O2 contains no non-empty subset
Γ such that Γ ∪ {CI} PL C. If CI ∧CII ∧CIII is the only element of I ′ then PL
CI → B , so OSB is derivable by the use of (MS1 ) and (ExtS1 ), so OFB is derivable
by the use of (NF1 ), (FS-1), so ∆∪ δ is DL2,F,S1 -inconsistent. If I ′ contains a non-
empty subset Π ⊆ O2 and PL ∧Π ∧ CI → B , then ¬OF(∧Π ∧ CI) ∈ ∆ due
to (MF1 ) and (Ext
F
1 ), and ¬OF(
∧
Π) ∈ ∆ due to (FS-1), but then OS¬∧Π is
derivable by the use of (FS-4), so Π is inconsistent with CI ∧CII ∧CIII and hence
cannot be in I ′. Now suppose CII is not vacuous. Then ¬OS¬CII is derivable with
(CS1 ), (M
S
1 ) and (Ext
S
1 ), and OFCII is derivable by the use of (FS-3), furthermore
due to (FS-1) we have OF(CI ∧ CII) ∈ ∆, so again if CI ∧ CII ∧ CIII is the only
element of I ′ and PL CI ∧CII → B then ∆ is DL2,F,S1 -inconsistent. If Π ⊆ OS
is a non-empty subset of I ′ such that Π ∪ {CI ∧ CII} PL B then ¬OF (∧Π ∧
CII) ∈ ∆ due to (FS-1), so ¬OF¬(∧Π → ¬CII) ∈ ∆, so with (FS-2) we derive
OS(
∧
Π → ¬CII), but then Π is inconsistent with CI ∧CII and not in I ′.
OS : Suppose B ∈ OS . If I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ contains CI ∧ CII ∧ CIII then I ′ PL B by virtue
of conjunct CI. Otherwise I ′ contains a sentence of the form C ∧ σ(C), C ∈
minPLOF (Lemma 5.1). From OSB , OFC we obtain OFB ∧ C by the use of
(FS-1), so OFB ∧ C ∈ ∆, and by the construction of minPLOF we have PL
C ↔ (B ∧C), so again I ′ PL B .
QS : If B ∈ QS then the sentence CI ∧ CII ∧ CIII constructed for B is in I . The con-
junction CI ∧CII ∧CIII is not PL-inconsistent: Suppose it is PL-inconsistent, and
assume O2 = ∅, so CII is vacuous and PL ¬CI, but this is excluded by (CS1 )
and (XIS1 ). Or O2 = ∅, but then PL CI → ¬CII, and since PL CI ∧ ¬CII → B
by the construction of CII, we have PL CI → B , so OSB is DL{2,F,S}-derivable
by (CS1 ), (M
S
1 ), and (Ext
S
1 ), and δ refutable. Likewise CI ∧ CII ∧ CIII does not
derive B , for otherwise PL CI ∧ CII → B , PL CI ∧ ¬CII → B , and again
PL CI → B . So some I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ contains CI ∧ CII ∧ CIII which does not by
itself derive B . Elements of the form C ∧σ(C), C ∈ minPLOF are excluded from
I ′ by CII. If there is some non-empty Γ ⊆ O2 such that Γ ∪ {CI ∧ CII} PL B
then since also PL CI ∧ ¬CII → B we have Γ ∪ {CI} PL B , but then consis-
tency of Γ with CI ∧ CII ∧ CIII is ruled out by CII. So one I ′ ∈ I − ⊥ does not
PL-derive B. 
7. Logics for extended languagesL[DLi ]
Let us return to the logics DLi1 treated in Section 2. In the languages L[DLi1], the
scope of deontic operators is restricted to sentences of propositional logic—formulas like
O4O4p1,¬O5(p2 ∧O5¬p3), in which deontic operators appear iterated or nested, are not
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well-formed. But semantically, this exclusion is artificial: I is a set of descriptive sentences,
and sentences like O4p1 are descriptive, stating that according to what the imperatives
demand, p1 must hold. Natural language gives evidence that imperative expressions may—
grammatically well-formed and meaningfully—refer to the existence of other demands or
permissions. Consider, e.g.:
(1) ‘Applicants shall be asked to produce statements in duplicate at their own costs.’
(2) ‘Students over 15y may be permitted to leave the grounds during breaks.’
To express a possible appearance of deontic notions within the scope of deontic opera-
tors, let the extended languagesL[DLi], 1 i  5, be the smallest sets such that
(a) if A ∈L[PL] then A ∈L[DLi ],
(b) if A, B ∈L[DLi], so are OiA,¬A, (A ∧B), (A ∨B), (A → B), and (A ↔ B).
Semantically, we again employ a pair I, v, where I ⊆L[DLi ]. The truth of proposition
letters is as usual, and for the deontic modalities we like to use the truth definitions given
in Section 1. Yet there is a snag: Since any A ∈L[DLi ] may appear in the scope of deontic
operators, the basic logic BL appearing in the definitions of operators O2−5 cannot be
propositional logic. We would like to make |=BL the entailment relation of the thus defined
DLi -semantics itself, but at the present point this creates a circle. We must therefore take
a detour: First we define the deontic degree δ(A) of any A ∈L[DLi] ( is any two-place
Boolean operator):
(i) δ(p) = 0,
(ii) δ(¬A) = δ(A),
(iii) δ(A  B) =
{
δ(A), if δ(A) δ(B),
δ(B), otherwise,
(iv) δ(OiA) = δ(A)+ 1.
For each i , 1  i  5, we define sublanguages L[DLin] = {A ∈ L[DLi ] | δ(A)  n},
n 0. Obviously,L[DLi0] =L[PL], L[DLin] ⊂L[DLin+1], and L[DLi ] =
⋃
nL[DLin].
For DLin-semantics, the truth of each A ∈L[DLin] is then defined as usual with respect
to a valuation v, and (for n 1) with respect to a set I ⊆ L[DLin−1]. In the DLin-truth
definitions of operators O2−5, the entailment relation |=BL is that of DLin−1. The ax-
iomatic systems DLin, n 1, are defined like DLi1, except that we allow all DLin-instances
of PL-tautologies and DLin−1-instances of the relevant axiom schemes (Min), (Cin), or
(Nin). (Exti1) now reads:
(Extin) If DLin−1 A ↔ B then DLin O
iA ↔ OiB , 2 i  5.
Theorem 7.1. All systems DLin, 1 i  5, n 1, are sound and complete with respect to
DLin-semantics.
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Proof. The proof proceeds just like for DLi . Note that strong completeness is proved1
inductively for DLin, using strong completeness of DLin−1. 
Let the axiomatic systems DLi be like DLin, except we now allow all DLi -instances in
PL-tautologies and relevant axiom schemes (Mi ), (Ci ), or (Ni ), and (Exti ) now reads:
(Exti ) If DLi A ↔ B then DLi OiA ↔ OiB , 2 i  5.
Theorem 7.2. For all A ∈L[DLi]: DLi A iff DLin A, n = δ(A).
Proof. For the left-to-right direction we do an induction on the construction of DLi : Sup-
pose DLi A. Induction basis: Assume A ∈ DLi by instantiation of sentences B1, . . . ,Bk
into a PL-theorem. Then {B1, . . . ,Bk} ⊆L[DLin], so there is the same instance for DLin.
Assume A ∈ DLi by instantiation of sentences B1,B2 into any of the DLi -axiom-schemes
(Mi ), (Ci ), (Ni ) or (Exti ). Then B1,B2 ∈ L[DLin−1], so there is the same instance for
DLin. The induction step for modus ponens is trivial. For the right-to-left direction do a
double induction on the construction of DLin: Suppose DLin A and suppose n = 1. Induc-
tion basis: Assume A ∈ DLi1 by instantiation of sentences B1, . . . ,Bk into a PL-theorem.
Then {B1, . . . ,Bk} ⊆L[DLi1] ⊆L[DLi ], so there is the same instance for DLi . Assume
A ∈ DLi1 by instantiation of sentences B1,B2 into any of the DLi1-axiom-schemes (Mi1),
(Ci1), or (N
i
1). Then B1,B2 ∈L[PL] ⊆L[DLi], so there is the same instance for DLi . As-
sume A ∈ DLi1 by an application of (Exti1). So (Exti1) is applied on a PL-theorem, which
is also in DLi . The induction step for modus ponens is again trivial. Suppose n 1. The
only non-trivial case is that A ∈ DLin by an application of (Extin): Then (Extin) is applied
to a DLin−1-theorem, which by the induction hypothesis is in DL
i
. 
Corollary 7.1. For all 1 i  5, n 1: DLin ⊂ DLin+1 and DLi =
⋃
n DL
i
n.
Proof. DLi =⋃n DLin is immediate from Theorem 7.2, and DLin ⊂ DLin+1 is proved by
induction on the construction of DLin just as in the right-to-left proof of Theorem 7.2. 
We are now able to give proper truth definitions for the deontic modalities of L[DLi ]:
I , v |= p iff v(p) = 1;
I , v |= O1A iff A ∈ I ;
I , v |= O2A iff ∃n ∈ N: ∃B ∈ I ∩L[DL2n]: |=DL2n B ↔ A;
I , v |= O3A iff ∃n ∈ N: ∃B ∈ I ∩L[DL3n]: |=DL3n B → A;
I , v |= O4A iff ∃n ∈ N: ∃B1, . . . ,Bk ∈ I ∩L[DL4n]: |=DL4n (B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bk) → A;
I , v |= O5A iff ∃n ∈ N: I ∩L[DL5n] |=DL5n A.
Theorem 7.3. DLi is sound and complete with respect to DLi -semantics.
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Proof. For soundness, the validity of DLi -instances in PL-theorems is trivial, and so is
the validity of (Mi ). The validity of (Ci ) is easily established using Corollary 7.1 as well
as the soundness and completeness of each DLin. For the DL4-validity of (Ext4), suppose
DL4 A ↔ B, so by Theorem 7.2 DL4n A ↔ B for n = δ(A ↔ B). So |=DL4n A ↔ B
by completeness of DL4n. Assume I, v |= O4A. So there are B1, . . . ,Bk ∈ I s.t. |=DLim
B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bk → A for some m ∈ N. Suppose m n. Then we have DL4m A ↔ B by
Corollary 7.1, so |=DLim B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bk → B by the truth definitions for Boolean operators.
So also I, v |= O4B. Suppose nm. Then |=DLin B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bk → A by Corollary 7.1, so
we also have |=DLin B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bk → B and I, v |= O4B. The assumption I, v |= O4B is
done likewise, so I, v |= O4A ↔ O4B, and |=DL4 O4A ↔ O4B since I, v were arbitrary.
The proof of DL5-validity of (Ext5) is done similarly.
The completeness of DLi is immediate for i = 1,2,3 due to Theorems 7.1, 7.2, so
consider case i = 4. As in the completeness proof for DL41, we construct a maximally
consistent set ∆ such that for all A ∈ L[DL4] either O4A ∈ ∆ or ¬O4A ∈ ∆. In or-
der to prove this set satisfiable, we let I = {A ∈ L[DL4] | O4A ∈ ∆}, and define v as
before (proof of Theorem 2.1). We have to show O4A ∈ ∆ iff I, v |= O4A. The left-
to-right direction is again trivial. For the right-to-left direction suppose O4A /∈ ∆, so
¬O4A ∈ ∆, and I, v |= O4A. Then there are B1, . . . ,Bk ∈ I s.t. |=DL4n B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bk → A
for some n ∈ N. By completeness of DL4n we have DL4n B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bk → A, so by
the use of (Ext4n+1) we obtain DL4n+1 O
4B1 ∧ · · · ∧ O4Bk → O4A and from Theo-
rem 7.2 we likewise have DL4 O4B1 ∧ · · · ∧ O4Bk → O4A. Since B1, . . . ,Bk ∈ I we
have {O4B1, . . . ,O4Bk,¬O4A} ⊆ ∆, and DL4 (O4B1 ∧ · · ·∧O4Bk ∧¬O4A) → ⊥. So
the r.a.a. makes ∆ inconsistent. Case i = 5 is done similarly, using strong completeness
of DL5n. 
Corollary 7.2. For all A ∈L[DLi]: |=DLi A iff |=DLin A, n = δ(A).
Proof. Immediate from Theorems 7.2 and 7.3. 
Corollary 7.3. The following equivalences hold:
I, v |= O1A iff A ∈ I ,
I, v |= O2A iff ∃B ∈ I : |=DL2 B ↔ A,
I, v |= O3A iff ∃B ∈ I : |=DL3 B → A,
I, v |= O4A iff ∃B1, . . . ,Bk ∈ I : |=DL4 (B1 ∧ · · · ∧ Bk) → A,
I, v |= O5A iff I |=DL5 A.
Proof. Immediate from the truth definitions for Oi -operators and Corollary 7.2. So the
truth definitions of Oi-operators are equivalent to taking DLi as ‘basic logic’. 
Consider the following DLi -sentences:
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(DT) Oi(OiA → A);
(D4) OiA → OiOiA;
(D4c) OiOiA → OiA;
(DB) Oi(A → Oi¬Oi¬A);
(DE) ¬Oi¬A → Oi¬Oi¬A.
None is a theorem of any DLi . To refute (D4c) in DL5, consider the set I = {O5p1}. We
have I |=DL5 O5p1, but not I |=DL5 p1, so I, v |= O5O5p1 is true, and I, v |= O5p1 false
for any v. So I, v |=O5O5p1 ∧¬O5p1, so DL5 O5O5p1 → O5p1 and DL5 O5O5p1 →
O5p1 by completeness of DL5. This also refutes (DT) since O5(O5p1 → p1) DL5-
derives O5O5p1 → O5p1 by the use of (C5), (Ext5), and (M5). The same set I refutes
theoremhood of (DB), I = {p1} refutes (D4), and, e.g., an empty set I refutes (DE).
Now (DT is widely accepted in deontic logics modelled prohairetically. In semantics
employing a deontic ‘ideality’ relation R, (DT) is valid if R is semi-reflexive, i.e., any
world ideal from some standpoint is ideal with respect to itself. In Hansson’s analysis of
monadic deontic logic, where a set of deontic formulas is modelled by a non-empty basis of
ideal among possible worlds, (DT)—if admitted as well-formed—is immediate from the
universality of ideality (cf. [9, pp. 381–382]). The same is true for Andersonian subsets of
sanction-free worlds within a set of worlds linked by an alethic accessibility relation, where
(DT) is derivable as soon as alethic necessities are made to hold at the actual world (cf.
[2, p. 187, Theorem OM45]). Føllesdal and Hilpinen [7] have called (DT) a “plausible-
looking candidate for logical truth”. And should not, as Prior [18, pp. 255–256] has
claimed, the acceptance of (DT) be trivial, reading it as ‘It ought to be the case that what
ought to be the case is the case’?
The non-derivability of (DT) in any system DLi brings to the fore the distinction be-
tween what Barcan Marcus [15] has called the descriptive and evaluative uses of ‘ought’.
Our definitions of Oi are descriptive, not evaluative: something is obligatory only if it is
(at least) derivable from what has been (factually) commanded. Thus O3O3p1 means that
there is an imperative that can be satisfied only if O3p1 is true. But having no analytical
content, a violation of this imperative is not excluded, which means that O3p1 is false, i.e.,
that there is, as a matter of fact, no imperative that demands—among other things—p1. To
use Marcus’s example: that parking on highways ought to be forbidden does not entail, in
the semantics employed here, that parking on highways is forbidden.
For similar reasons, factual statements about the set of imperative demands cannot be
meaningfully employed for conditional commands. Consider the sentence O3(¬O3A →
A). Does it entail O3A? Let I = {¬O3p1 → p1}, so I, v |= O3(¬O3p1 → p1) is true,
whatever v is. However, DL3 (¬O3p1 → p1) → O3p1, as can be seen from I ′ = ∅,
v′(p1) = 1. So I, v  O3p1. Possibly one may want to admit commands like ‘If it is not
(already) obligatory to do α, then do α (by virtue of this command)!’, and the addressee
should be able to conclude that (now) she has an obligation to do α. However, such con-
ditional expressions are not expressible in the language and semantics presented so far.
Exploring how imperative semantics can be extended to cover such and other conditional
expressions, and how to sail around the maelstrom of self-referentiality lurking behind the
above example, must be left to further study.
J. Hansen / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 39–61 61
8. ConclusionWhen the question is what ought to be, according to some existing norms or impera-
tives, it seems natural to employ a semantics that models the meaning of deontic operators
with respect to these imperatives, rather than some notion of absolute or relative ‘better-
ness’. Existing modal systems relate rather simply to ought-operators of different strength,
defined with respect to a set of sentences that describe what the imperatives demand. To
mix such operators is, however, generally not an option if the resulting semantics is to be
represented by a strongly complete axiomatic system, and the same holds for the use of re-
strictions on the number and kind of imperatives to be considered. To cope with conflicting
imperatives, we may define a van-Fraassen-type operator that prohibits the agglomeration
of contradicting demands, and a ‘sceptical’ ought-operator according to which something
is obligatory only if there is no conflicting demand; both are best represented in systems
that also contain operators which relate more directly to imperatives. In the light of the
fact that natural languages do not prohibit the use of deontic modalities within imperative
expressions, it is a welcome result that imperative semantics is possible, and sound and
completely axiomatizable for logical languages that permit iterated and nested deontic op-
erators. Here the roads of ‘ought’ defined evaluatively and ‘ought’ defined with respect to
given norms part, as demonstrated by the fact that statements like ‘it ought to be that what
ought to be is the case’ remain well formed, but are true accidentally only.
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